














The Liberal International Order Was Established by the 1946 
Reorganization of Anglo-American Military Alliance to Anti-
Soviet Mission!—The Truman-Montgomery White House 
Meeting on September 11, 1946 and Its Related Developments
柴 山 　 太
Futoshi Shibayama
G. John Ikenberry, by introducing the notion of Liberal International Order (LIO), made a re-
markable contribution to the reviving of the Cold War Studies (he also uses another new concept, 
Liberal Internationalism as an evolved concept for advancing and widening LIO). With his LIO 
concept, it is possible to understand three historical periods, namely the Cold War, the post-Cold 
War, and the present as one historical continuity. However, his approach is haunted by common 
mistakes of distinguished historians and scholars of international relations; particularly, they 
have mistaken the beginning and basic organization of Western military alliances, which even 
Ikenberry acknowledges as the most significant basis of LIO and Liberal Internationalism. The 
network of Western military alliances began with neither the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 nor 
even the Dunkirk Pact in 1947, but with the reorganization of Anglo-American military alliance 
from anti-Axis to anti-Soviet in 1946. It was the Anglo-American (in fact, Anglo-American-
Canadian) military alliance, though informal (meaning the lack of treaty), which became the very 
basis of the network of Western alliances, and, certainly, it inherited quite a lot from the wartime 
Anglo-American alliance, in organizations, institutions, and norms, besides the common lan-
guage and culture, the spectacular advantage in forming and continuing the alliance. This article 
illustrates the final phase of the reorganizing process at the White House meeting on September 
11, 1946, where President Harry S. Truman approved the request by CIGS Field Marshal Bernard 
L. Montgomery to start the Anglo-American-Canadian military talks, obviously against the 
Soviet Union, not against any other. Actually, this was the last page of the reorganization, while 
my another article “The Outbreak of the Cold War as an International History” (2019-2020) de-
scribes the early process of the reorganization, which started among the Anglo-American mili-
taries even before the Fulton Address of March 5, 1946. The 1946 Anglo-American alliance was 
global in nature, not regional, and it intended to establish Anglo-American co-hegemony and 
tame the Soviet Union to peacefully live in the hegemony. As my other article “Military Origins 
of NSC-68” (2000) illustrates, only after the beginning of 1948, the U.S., the U.K., and Canada, 
due to intensified Cold War struggles, started formulating detailed war plans against the Soviet 
Union, for emergency, mid-term, and long-term, with an organization map of world-wide com-
mand and force deployment. But, as this article (2021) covers, their process of sharing a strategic 
concept, the very basis of common war planning, started with General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 
論文（Article）
talks with British Chiefs of Staff Committee in October 1946, now supported by the Presidential 
approval at the WH meeting with Monty. Though additional in nature, this article covers the re-
lated developments with the final reorganization process and the beginning of military planning. 
In late 1946, the U.S. government and military as well as the U.K. counterparts believed that 
they enjoyed a distinguished superiority in war-making power, though potential in total war style 
of warfare, and that the Soviets were then suffering from wartime exhaustion and huge human 
losses. This article shares an episode that Swiss via ex-primer Winston S. Churchill requested 
a possible assistance from the U.K., in case the Soviet Union started a massive military rolling 
over the continental Western Europe. However, Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee with the sup-
port of the British military declined the Swiss concern with their more detailed studies on Soviet 
military power, which denied Swiss accounts of Soviet overwhelming power and its capabilities 
of quick response. Related with this episode, this article describes the present research level of 
post-war Soviet military planning, though not thorough at all. This article also describes Attlee’s 
failed “revolt” against Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin and Foreign Ministry as well as the British 
military on the issue of defending British sphere of influence in the Middle East and promoting 
an appeasement toward the Soviet Union. This episode illustrates how powerfully the Anglo-
American co-hegemony settled down inside the U.K. government and the military, up to the 
level of easily denying prime minister’s quest. Lastly, this article describes the episode of Joseph 
Stalin’s expressing his resistance, at the Kremlin meeting with Monty on January 10, 1947, 
against the establishment of Anglo-American military alliance for Anti-Soviet purpose, which 
also meant Anglo-American co-hegemony. Very few historians, dealing with the early Cold War, 
cover this episode, though most historians never failed to cover the Truman Doctrine, proclaimed 
on March 12, 1947. This article argues that, in retrospect, Stalin’s expression of resistance was a 
clear-cut declaration against the Liberal International Order. 
キーワード：	自由主義国際秩序、冷戦の起源、英米共同覇権、モントゴメリー元帥、
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と地球秩序の危機（A World Safe for Democracy: 





1	 G.	John	Ikenberry, A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order	(New	Haven,	Yale	U.P.,	2020).	
この本の原型は、次の論文である。Ikenberry,	 “The	End	of	Liberal	 International	Order?” International Affairs,	Vol.	94,	No.	1	 (2018)	
pp.	7-23.	参照Talbot	Imlay,	“Western	Allied	Ideology,	1939-1945”	in	Richard	J.	B.	Bosworth	and	Joseph	A.	Maiolo	eds., The Cambridge 
History of the Second World War, Vol. II Politics and Ideology	(Cambridge,	Cambridge	U.P.,	2015)	p.	67.
23



























































2	 Stephen	Wertheim, Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy	 (Cambridge,	Belknap	Press,	 2020)	C-3.	G.	 John	
Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, New Edition	 (Princeton,	
Princeton	U.P.,	2019).	Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order	(Princeton,	
Princeton	U.P.,	2011).	Ikenberry, A World Safe for Democracy.
3	 Ibid.	Mira	Rapp-Hooper, Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances	(Cambridge	MA,	Harvard	U.P.,	2020).	他
方、西側軍事同盟ネットワークに関する理解不足の好例が、欧米での同盟理論研究の実質的出発点であるS・M・ウォルトの研究にも見ら





Adam	Watson, Hegemony & History	(London,	Routledge,	2007).
24
































































4	 Ritchie	Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War 1945-1951	 (London,	
George	Allen	&	Unwin,	1985)	p.	46;	Terry	H.	Anderson, The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947	(Columbia,	MO,	
University	of	Missouri	Press,	1981)	pp.	140-141.	他には、著名な歴史家レイノルズの名著もあるが。David	Reynolds, From World War to 


























































































































































































































9	 “Memorandum	for	General	Eisenhower	 [from	T.T.H.]”	 (August	15,	1946). FRUS, 1946, VII,	p.	841.	Walter	Millis	ed., The Forrestal 
Diaries	(N.Y.,	Viking	Press,	1951)	p.	192.
28







































































10	 Dean	Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department	(N.Y.,	Norton,	1969)	pp.	195-196. The Forrestal Diaries,	p.	192.
29

















































































































































16	 FRUS, 1946, Vol. I,	pp.	895-897.
31





































































17	 Lord	 Inverchapel	 to	Mr.	Bevin,	No.	590	 (September	2nd,	1946,	 received	on	September	6th)	 in	Richard	D.	G.	Crockatt	ed., British 
Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part IV From 1946 through 1950, Series 
C North America 1946, Volume 1, 1946	(University	Publications	of	America,	1999)	p.	273;	pp.	276-277.
18	 Ibid.,	p.	276.
32



































































19	 Lord	 Inverchapel	 to	Mr.	Bevin,	No.	 596	 (September	8,	 1946,	 received	on	September	11th)	 in	Richard	D.	G.	Crockatt	ed., British 
Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part IV From 1946 through 1950, Series 
C North America 1946, Volume 1, 1946	(University	Publications	of	America,	1999)	p.	282.
33





























































20	 Viscount	of	Alamein, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery	 (South	Yorkshire,	Pen	and	Sword	Books,	2020,	First	Published	by	
Collins	Clear-Type	Press	 in	1958)	pp.	380-381;	pp.	440-441.	「アンシンカブル」作戦については、鈴木陽一「想像を絶する作戦―チャーチル
のロシア急襲計画1945年7月1日」『国際政治』144号（2006年2月）69-84頁。拙稿「トリエステ危機と「アンシンカブル」作戦」『同志社法学』（2006
年9月）第58巻、第4号（2006年9月）1407-1456頁。参照Jonathan	Walker, Churchill's Third Word War: British Plans to Attack the Soviet 
Empire, 1945	(Brimscombe	Port	Stroud,	The	History	Press,	2017).
21	 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery,	p.	441.	参照Nigel	Hamilton,	Monty: Final Years of the Field-Marshall, 1944-1976	 (N.Y.,	
1987)	pp.	657-658.	“Note	of	a	Statement	made	by	C.A.S.	to	the	Prime	Minister	on	Friday,	13th	September.	(First	Sea	Lord	and	V.C.I.G.S.	























































































































































































































26	 Lord	Inverchapel	 to	Mr.	Bevin,	No.	606	 (September	16,	1946,	received	on	September	19th);	Lord	Inverchapel	 to	Mr.	Bevin,	No.	621	
(September	30,	1946,	received	on	October	3rd)	in	Richard	D.	G.	Crockatt	ed., British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part IV From 1946 through 1950, Series C North America 1946, Volume 1, 1946	(University	
Publications	of	America,	1999)	pp.	284-286;	p.	288;	p.	338.
27	 Alan	Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951	(New	York,	Norton,	1983)	p.	315.
37





































































30	 Jamil	Hasanli, Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War 1945-1953	 (Lanham,	Lexington	Books,	2011)	p.	240.	Albert	Resis	ed., 
Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev	(Chicago,	Ivan	R.	Dee,	1993)	p.	74.
38




























































































































































































































































































36	 Lord	Moran, Churchill: The Struggle for Survival 1945-1960	(N.Y.,	Carroll	&	Graf	Publishers,	2006)	(originally	in	1966	in	the	U.K.)	pp.	
25-26.
37	 Martin	Gulbert, ‘Never Despair’: Winston S. Churchill 1945-1965	(London,	Heinemann,	1988)	pp.	260-267.	G.	W.	Sand	ed., Defending the 
West: The Truman-Churchill Correspondence, 1945-1960	(Westport	CT,	Praeger,	2004)	pp.	160-161.
42







































































Gulbert, ‘Never Despair’: Winston S. Churchill 1945-1965,	p.	283.
40	 “Ismay	to	PM	(November	4,	1946)”;	“PFRB	to	PM	(November	4,	1946),”	PREM	8/342.
43






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































59	 Ismay	to	PM	(December	2,	1946);	Attlee	to	Churchill	 (December	3,	1946);	Churchill	 to	Attlee	 (December	3,	1946);	Attlee	to	Churchill	
(December	6,	1946);	Ismay	to	PM	(December	6,	1946)	PREM	8/342.
60	 Churchill	to	Attlee	(December	10,	1946)	PREM	8/342.
61	 M.	Gulbert, ‘Never Despair’: Winston S. Churchill 1945-1965,	p.	286.
50





















































































































































































































64	 この時期のソ連人民の窮状を研究した最近の研究として、Jeffrey	W.	Jones, Everyday Life and the “Reconstruction” of Soviet Russia 
During and After the Great Patriotic War, 1943-1948	(Bloomington,	IN,	SLAVICA,	2008).	著名なスターリン伝記作家は、学問的に受け入
れられている戦中死者数は2千7百万人、これに加えて46〜 47年飢餓は150万人の死者とその何倍もの栄養障害者を出したと書いた。Oleg	
V.	Khlevniuk,	trans.	by	Nora	Seligman	Favorov, Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator	 (New	Haven,	Yale	U.P.,	2015)	p.	261.	東欧の状況
については、アン・アプルボーム著（山崎博康訳）『鉄のカーテン―東欧の壊滅1944-56上下』（白水社、2019年）。Anne	Applebaum, IRON 
CURTAIN: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944-1956	(N.Y.,	Doubleday,	2012).
53





































































65	 Elena	Zubkova,	 trans.	by	Hugh	Ragsdale, Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957	 (Armonk,	M.E.	
Sharpe,	1998)	pp.	40-41;	p.	44;	p.	47;	p.	49.	Yoram	Gorlizki	and	Oleg	Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-
1953	(N.Y.,	Oxford	U.P.,	2004)	pp.	24-25.	Nicolas	Werth, La Terreur et le Desarroi: Staline et son systeme	(Paris,	Perrin,	2007)	pp.	416-417.	
Jones, Everyday Life and the “Reconstruction” of Soviet Russia During and After the Great Patriotic War, 1943-1948,	pp.	70-71.
54




































































































































































































































































































70	 David	M.	Glantz,	“Soviet	Military	Strategy	After	CFE:	Historical	Models	and	Future	Prospects,” The Journal of Soviet Military Studies,	
Vol.	3,	No.	2	(1990)	p.	290.
58




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































85	 “Report	 to	Washington	on	Montgomery’s	Conversation	with	Stalin,”	 January	17,	 1947,	History	and	Public	Policy	Program	Digital	
Archive,	National	Archives	of	the	UK,	http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/134377	モントゴメリー回顧録によるこの会談叙
述は、 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery,	pp.	447-452.
86	 “Report	to	Washington	on	Montgomery’s	Conversation	with	Stalin,”	January	17,	1947.
87	 The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery,	pp.	452-453;	p.	455.
66



































































































































Journal  of  Policy  Studies   No.63  (September  2021)
